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Abstract
We develop methods for describing distributions of income growth across individuals
and for comparing changes in growth distributions over time. The methods include
graphical devices (‘income growth profiles’) and dominance conditions, and also
summary indices, together with associated methods of estimation and inference.
Taking an explicitly longitudinal perspective, our approach illuminates clearly who
are the gainers and the losers, and also provides distributionally-sensitive assess-
ments – ones that allow the income growth for different individuals to be weighted
differently. Our empirical application shows that the pattern of income growth in
Britain over the period 1992–1996 was less pro-poor than that for 1998–2002 and
not significantly different from the pattern for 2001–2005.
Keywords: individual income growth; pro-poor growth; progressive income growth;
income mobility; income growth profile
JEL Classification: D31; D63; I32
Introduction
The income distribution in each year can be characterized as a Parade of Dwarfs and a
few Giants (Pen, 1971). Each individual in the population is represented by a person
who has a height proportional to the individual’s income, and these representatives are
lined up in order of height with the shortest at the front. Income growth over time corre-
sponds to changes in the heights of Parade participants. There is typically a distribution
of income changes – there are winners and losers – a feature that is missed by looking at
the average or aggregate income growth rate, the focus of most discussion. This point is
highlighted by Recommendation 4 of the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi Commission (‘Give more
prominence to the distributional aspects when assessing social progress’), supported by
their statement that ‘[a]verage income, consumption and wealth are meaningful statistics,
but they do not tell the whole story about living standards. For example, a rise in aver-
age income could be unequally shared across groups, leaving some households relatively
worse-off than others.’ (Stiglitz et al., 2009, 13). In this paper, we address the issue
of how to summarize income growth that is unequally shared. We develop methods for
distributionally-sensitive assessments of income growth and illustrate them using data for
Britain.
Researchers often assess changes in the personal distribution of income growth by
comparing incomes at a series of common points in the income Parades for different
years, for example at the deciles or vingtiles of each Parade. Growth incidence curves,
graphs that summarize these calculations, are used in development economics (Ravallion
and Chen, 2003) and have also been used to summarize income growth in the UK (see e.g.
Joyce et al., 2010, Chapter 3). There is also a related literature developing indices of the
pro-poorness of income growth: see the review by Essama-Nssah and Lambert (2009).
As a means of describing who has got better off or worse off, growth incidence curves
and pro-poor growth indices miss some important aspects. Looking at the change in
the income of the person at a specific quantile of Parade A and the person at the same
quantile of Parade B ignores the fact that the persons concerned are not the same indi-
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viduals. Over time, people change their position in the income Parade. As a recent US
assessment of distributional impact of the Great Recession put it: ‘cross-sectional data
do not necessarily tell us how individual households are faring over time, since the group
of households in the bottom 20 percent changes each year: some previously high-earnings
households move into the bottom 20 percent, and some households that were previously
in the bottom 20 percent move out of it’ (Perri and Steinberg, 2012, 12; emphasis in
original). Similarly, people move into and out of top income groups (Auten et al., 2013).
More generally, every income group throughout the income range changes its composition
over time (as we confirm later). To assess whether the individuals who are poor (or rich)
this year are gainers or losers, one has to track the fortunes of individuals not the fortunes
of income groups such as ‘the poor’ or ‘the rich’ whose composition may change from one
year to the next. Longitudinal data are required since it is only these data that enable
one to link the income of a specific individual in Parade A with her income in Parade B,
and hence calculate the income growth that each individual experiences.
The need for distributionally-sensitive measures of income growth was recognized be-
fore Stiglitz et al. (2009). For example, Ahluwalia and Chenery (1974) criticized the
weighting scheme underlying assessments based on the change in GDP per capita or av-
erage income (the growth rate for each quantile group is weighted by its share in total
income). They proposed a more general approach in which ‘the rate of increase in the wel-
fare of society as a whole can [be] defined as a weighted sum of the growth of all groups’,
where each group’s weight could be ‘set according to the degree of distributional empha-
sis required’ (Ahluwalia and Chenery, 1974, 39). They discuss in particular weighting
schemes in which the weights are either ‘in proportion to their numbers (“one man, one
vote”) or inversely proportional to their initial income levels (“poverty weights”)’ (Ch-
enery, 1974, xvi). The former scheme provides equal weighting of each person’s income
growth. ‘Poverty’ weighting schemes include ones in which the weights are ‘a declining
function of the rank in the income distribution’ (Klasen, 1994, 259).1 This is the scheme
underlying the approach we propose, and we discuss it in more detail later.
In this article, we develop a comprehensive framework for describing and evaluating
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the personal distribution of income growth, and changes in these distributions over time.
We motivate our approach with discussion of previous literature on the topic in Section
1. The approach itself is set out in Section 2. We develop graphical devices (income
growth profiles and cumulative income growth profiles) for describing distributions of
individual-level income growth and show that non-intersections of profiles correspond to
dominance according to general classes of social evaluation functions. We also develop
distributionally-sensitive summary indices, and these include the average growth rate
as a special case. In Section 3, we show that issues of statistical inference raised by
our approach can be addressed using bootstrap methods for dependent clustered data.
The following two sections apply the measurement and estimation methods to analyze
patterns of income growth in Britain over subperiods in the two decades since the early
1990s. The data, derived from the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) are described
in Section 4, and our findings are presented in Section 5. Section 6 contains a summary
and conclusions. Various extensions and sensitivity analyses are reported in Appendices.
1 Previous literature
There are three components to the social evaluation of income growth: a measure of
income growth for each individual (call it δi), the individual-specific weight applied to
that measure, and the way in which the personal distribution of weighted growth is
aggregated across individuals.
If an equal weighting scheme is adopted (and subject to an appropriate definition of
δ, about which more later), social evaluations of income growth reduce to comparisons of
the (univariate) personal distributions of δ. See the applications of first-order stochastic
dominance checks by Fields et al. (2002) and Chen (2009), for example. For the Fields
and Ok (1999) index of directional income mobility, δ is the change over time in log
income, there are equal weights, and the aggregate index is the population average of the
δ.
More general systems of weighting of the δi are characterized axiomatically by De-
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muynck and Van de gaer (2012), for example, who posit an axiom of Priority for Lower
Growth that states that aggregate growth is increased more by an increment to the in-
come growth of someone with a low growth rate than someone with a high growth rate.
In the aggregate growth index that they derive, different ‘priorities’ are summarized para-
metrically, and equal weights is a special case. However, these indices do not reflect the
principal concerns of Ahluwalia and Chenery (1974), Klasen (1994), Stiglitz et al. (2009),
and most subsequent literature, because the weights depend only on each individual’s
income growth rate. An income growth rate of 5% for person i and for person j is treated
the same regardless of whether i was rich and j was poor initially.
It is more plausible to suppose that aggregate social evaluations of growth processes
should depend not only on individual growth but also on information about base-year (or
final-year) positions. In this case, evaluations based on utilitarian social welfare functions
(SWFs) are one obvious approach. By these, we mean SWFs that are the population
average of individuals’ utility functions in which base-period and final-period incomes are
arguments, as in Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982). For instance,
W (H) =
∫ ∫
v(x, y)dH(x, y)
where H is the joint distribution of income at base- and final-period income and v(x, y)
is the individual utility associated with base-period income x and final-period income
y. (The form of v(x, y) is common to all individuals.) The definitive analysis using this
framework is by Bourguignon (2011), who derives dominance conditions characterizing
when one personal distribution of income growth (‘growth process’) is socially preferred
to another distribution.
For the purposes at hand, Bourguignon (2011) rewrites the Atkinson-Bourguignon
utility function to be defined over base-period personal income x and the change in
personal income between base-period and final-period c (so, δi = ci = yi − xi):
W (H) =
∫ ∫
v(x, x+ c)dH(x, x+ c) =
∫ ∫
u(x, c)dH(x, x+ c)
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where u(x, c) is the individual utility re-expressed as a function of base-period income
and income change (i.e. u(x, c) = v(x, x + c)). Bourguignon shows that if the marginal
distributions of base-year income are identical, a social preference for distribution of
income growth C over distribution D for all SWFs increasing in c (class V1) requires
the conditional CDF of income growth to be everywhere no greater in C than in D at
every point along the base-period income parade (which also implies that the average
income change in C is greater than in D at each point). In other words, the conditional
distribution of income change in C must first-order dominate that inD for any base-period
income level. Drawing on the results of Atkinson and Bourguignon (1987), Bourguignon
(2011) derives a second dominance condition for a narrower class of SWFs, those that are
not only increasing in individual income growth but also concave: an increase in income
is valued more if it is received by individuals who are initially poorer (class V2). For
this class, social preference for C over D requires that the conditional CDF of income
changes given base-period income lower or equal to x in C first-order dominates that in
D for all base year income x. Class V2 includes SWFs defined over final-year income
only and CES-like functions in which base- and final-year income are substitutes but not
necessarily perfectly so, as in the ‘permanent’ (longitudinally-averaged) income case.
Bourguignon’s results highlight the challenges facing researchers wishing to take a
distributionally-sensitive approach to assessments that takes both base-year and final-year
income positions into account. On the one hand, the results usefully delineate conditions
under which personal distributions of income growth can be unanimously ordered, while
using a relatively conventional SWF-based approach. On the other hand, the conditions
are remarkably restrictive. They are applicable only if the marginal distributions in the
base year are identical, which is never likely to be the case when comparing growth
distributions for the same country for different periods or between different countries.2
And, in any case, the dominance conditions are demanding, and may well not be satisfied.3
Thus, summary indices are almost certainly likely to be required to order distributions
of individual income growth, but Bourguignon’s (2011) paper does not consider these –
or methods of statistical inference. We do so in this paper.
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In sum, there is a need for a different approach to the measurement of distributionally-
sensitive income growth, one that is both practically feasible and has consistent welfare
foundations. The aim of this paper is to provide this approach and to demonstrate its
empirical implementation, including methods for estimation and inference.
2 A framework for evaluating distributions of individual
income growth
This section develops methods for comparing distributions of individual income growth
corresponding to two time periods. (The methods could also be used for comparisons
between growth for two regions or countries.) We propose graphical devices (‘income
growth profiles’) for describing distributions of income growth, and derive relationships
between configurations of income growth profiles, orderings according to social evaluation
functions defined over bivariate income distributions, and classes of scalar indices of
individual income growth.
2.1 Distributionally-sensitive evaluations
A social evaluation function for patterns of individual income growth can be written as
Υ(H) where H is the joint distribution function of two positive random variables X and
Y describing income distributions for years t and t + τ respectively: H(x, y) = Pr[X ≤
x, Y ≤ y]. Loosely speaking, individual income growth is the change from X to Y , a
form of directional income movement to use the language of Fields and Ok (1999). We
propose that the evaluation function Υ(H) satisfy seven properties, discussed in turn.
Property 1. Individualistic and additive evaluations Υ(H) is the sum of individual-
level income growth evaluations, U (x, y;H), each of which summarizes income growth
for a person with income x in year t and y in year t + τ . U (x, y;H) may be positive,
zero, or negative, since an individual’s income may rise, stay the same, or fall over time.
In other words, social evaluations are individualistic and additive, as commonly assumed
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in the income inequality and poverty measurement literatures. We allow U to depend
on the overall bivariate income distribution function H, so that in general the evaluation
of a person’s income growth may depend on the incomes of other individuals in the
population.
Property 2. Replication invariance Comparisons of two distributions are independent
of the size of the populations (as in the inequality and poverty measurement literatures).
Properties 1 and 2 imply that the overall social evaluation is a per-capita average:
Υ(H) =
∫ z+
z−
∫ z+
z−
U(r, s;H)dH(r, s) (1)
where [z−, z+] is the support of X and Y .
Property 3. Socially-weighted individual income growth We assume that the individual-
level growth evaluation function for each person is the product of a component summa-
rizing how much growth the person experiences (assessed in a manner common to all
individuals) and a social weight that depends on the person’s income rank in the base
year. (This way of specifying an evaluation function follows Chakravarty (1984).) The
aggregate evaluation function (1) can therefore be written as
Υ(H) =
∫ z+
z−
∫ z+
z−
w(FX(r))δ(r, s)dH(r, s) (2)
where the social weight is w(FX(r)) > 0, FX is the marginal cumulative distribution of
base-year incomes, and δ(x, y) is the ‘growth distance function’ common to all individuals.
Social weights depend on base-year ranks, and hence are independent of the particular
distribution of base-year incomes. With our specification for Υ(H), our approach departs
from Bourguignon’s (2011). So far, Υ(H) could be interpreted as an aggregate Atkinson-
Bourguignon bivariate SWF. However, our aim is not to derive an aggregate welfare
measure for the joint bivariate distribution of income but, rather, to make an evaluation
of the patterns of growth that is sensitive to how individual growth is distributed along
the initial income ordering.4
Property 4. Normalisation We also assume that w is scaled such that the average
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social weight is one (
∫
w(FX(r)) dFX = 1). This makes Υ(H) a weighted average of
individual income growth.
Property 5. Social preference for progressive income growth. That is, we suppose
w′(p) ≤ 0, which means that the impact on Υ(H) of an increment to δ (·) is greater
(or no smaller), the lower the individual’s income in the base year (t). Giving greater
weight to initially-poorer individuals builds in a social preference for greater equality in
final-year (t + τ) incomes than in base-year (t) incomes, other things being equal. An
important reference point is w(p) = 1, for all p. This is the boundary case of neutrality
towards differential income growth: Υ(H) is then simply the population average of the
individual-level growth statistics, which we write for brevity as δ.
Property 6. Income growth is directional Since individuals’ income changes may be
positive or negative, we suppose that the growth distance function is directional. We
follow Fields and Ok (1999, p. 460) who define this to mean that δ(x, y) = −δ (y, x) and
also δ(x, ρx) > δ(x, x) for all ρ > 1, where δ (·) is a continuous function. We also introduce
the normalization δ (x, x) = 0. These conditions ensure that positive income growth for an
individual corresponds to a social improvement (Υ(H) increases) and negative individual
income growth corresponds to a reduction in Υ(H), ceteris paribus.
Property 7. The growth distance function is either (a) scale invariant, or (b) trans-
lation invariant. Case (a) refers to a requirement that δ (λx, λy) = δ(x, y). Case (b)
requires δ (x+ η, y + η) = δ(x, y). In our empirical application, we focus on two speci-
fications for δ (·). The first is log(y) − log(x) which is the case that we shall refer to as
proportionate income growth (satisfying case a); the second is y− x which we refer to as
absolute income growth (case b).5 Remember that because income growth is directional
(Property 6), δ (·) may be positive or negative. Also, in conjunction with the other prop-
erties, scale invariance of δ (·) implies scale invariance of Υ(H), and translation invariance
of δ (·) implies translation invariance of Υ(H).6
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2.2 Income growth profiles and dominance relations
An alternative but equivalent expression for Υ(H) is useful for subsequent discussion.
Since H(r, s) = FY |X=r(s)× FX(r) where FY |X=x is the cumulative distribution of final-
year incomes conditional on base-year income x, we can rewrite (2) as
Υ(H) =
∫ z+
z−
(∫ z+
z−
w(FX(r))δ(r, s)dFY |X=r(s)
)
dFX(r) (3)
≡
∫ z+
z−
w(FX(r)) E (δ (r, y) |X = r) dFX(r) (4)
=
∫ 1
0
w(p) E (δ (x(p), y) |X = x(p)) dp (5)
where E (δ (r, y;H) |X = r) is the expected (average) income growth for individuals with
a base-year income r. Equation (5) uses the change of variable p = FX(r), so p ∈ [0, 1]
is the normalized rank in the base-year income distribution corresponding to income r,
and x(p) = F−1X (p) is the income corresponding to rank p in the base-year distribution.
For brevity, we refer to the conditional expectation as m(p) and rewrite (5) as:
Υ(H) =
∫ 1
0
w(p)m(p) dp. (6)
Thus, instead of writing the aggregate evaluation in terms of a weighted average of
the individual evaluations, we can express it equivalently in terms of weighted averages
of expectations of individual-level income growth conditional on position in the base-year
income parade, m(p). We use this alternative representation when discussing income
growth profiles below.7
Unambiguous orderings of pairs of distributions of individual income growth according
to social evaluation functions with the properties just discussed correspond to dominance
defined in terms of income growth profiles and cumulative income growth profiles.
An income growth profile is the plot of m(p) against p, given a definition of δ (·).8 The
income growth profile reveals how income growth is distributed according to position in
the base year income distribution. If income growth – assessed using m(p) – is the same
for everyone, the profile is horizontal. The income growth profile has negatively-sloped
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sections over the ranges of p where individual income growth decreases as p increases
(progressive income growth); and the profile has positively-sloped sections over the ranges
of p where individual income growth increases as p increases (regressive income growth).9
Cumulative income growth profiles are plots of the average income growth for people
with an initial income at or below a given percentile x(p) in the base-year distribution,
i.e. among the poorest 100p percent. That is, one plots
1
p
∫ p
0
m(q)dq (7)
against p ∈ [0, 1]. The resulting graph plots areas below the income growth profile
– analogous to the way that a generalized Lorenz curve shows areas below a quantile
function. The slope of the cumulative income growth profile may be positive or negative
at different p values. The cumulative profile’s height at p = 1 is δ.
We may now state two results concerning comparisons of distributions of income
growth. For proofs (using integration by parts) and further discussion, see Van Kerm
(2006, 2009). We consider comparisons between period A which refers to income growth
between year t and year t+ τ , and period B which refers to income growth between year
s and year s+ τ . Assessments are made using the evaluation functions described earlier:
the comparison is of Υ(HA) and Υ(HB) for periods A and B.
Proposition 1 (Income growth profile (first order) dominance) LetmA(p) andmB(p)
denote the income growth profiles for periods A and B respectively. mA(p) ≥ mB(p)
∀p ∈ [0, 1] if and only if Υ(HA) ≥ Υ(HB) for any Υ with w(p) > 0.
Proposition 2 (Cumulative income growth profile (second order) dominance)
Let C(p) = 1
p
∫ p
0 m(q)dq. CA(p) ≥ CB(p) ∀p ∈ [0, 1] if and only if Υ(HA) ≥ Υ(HB) for
any Υ with w(p) > 0 and w′(p) ≤ 0.
Income growth profile dominance states that finding the profile for periodA is nowhere
below and somewhere above the profile for period B is equivalent to the distribution of
individual income growth for A being preferred to the distribution for B for any non-
10
negative social weight function w(p). Cumulative income growth profile dominance states
that finding the cumulative profile for period A is nowhere below and somewhere above
the profile for period B is equivalent to the distribution of individual income growth for A
being preferred to the distribution for B for any positive non-increasing weight function
w(p).
2.3 Indices of progressivity-adjusted growth and return-to-progressivity
Income growth profile dominance provides robust but only partial orderings of distribu-
tions of income growth with respect to the shape of the social weight function w(·) in
the evaluation function Υ. Complete orderings by scalar indices that incorporate a social
preference for progressive growth can be derived with further assumptions about the w(·).
We refer to these as indices of ‘progressivity-adjusted growth’.
In our analysis, we employ a class of single-parameter indices Υv in which the so-
cial weight function is defined using the rank-dependent scheme that is implicit in the
generalized Gini inequality index (Donaldson and Weymark, 1980, Yitzhaki, 1983):
w(p) = v (1− p)v−1 (8)
where v ≥ 1. For all 0 < p < 1, w(p) > 0, and w′(p) ≤ 0 as long as v > 1, so the
dominance results provide orderings for these indices. The larger that v is, the faster
the decrease in the social weight as p increases, and hence the greater the preference for
progressive income growth. If v = 2, weights decrease linearly with p from 2 to 0; if
1 < v < 2, w(p) is concave; and if v > 2, w(p) is convex. If v = 1, Υv = δ¯.
Υv reflects both levels of income growth and differences between individuals. There
is also interest in summarizing the social return to the progressivity of individual income
growth per se, i.e. the increase in social welfare that arises over and above the average
growth experienced by the population as a whole (which varies with the business cycle).
A natural index of the return to progressive growth is Gv = Υv− δ. This measure can be
interpreted as the difference between observed average growth and equally-distributed-
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equivalent growth – the growth which, if received uniformly by each individual, would
yield the same overall evaluation as the observed average growth were it also received
uniformly. The more positive that Gv is, the more progressive is income growth; negative
values correspond to regressive income growth.10
3 Estimation and inference
3.1 Estimation of income growth profiles
Estimation of progressivity-adjusted growth indices, growth incidence curves and poverty
growth curves is relatively straightforward because they involve standard estimators for
concentration indices, quantiles, and incomplete means; see inter alia Chotikapanich and
Griffiths (2001), Barrett and Donald (2009), and Verma and Betti (2011). We therefore
focus our discussion on the estimation of income growth profiles.
Income growth profiles are examples of fractile graphs (Mahalanobis, 1960), func-
tions that capture the relationship between an outcome (here income growth) and the
fractiles of a covariate (here base-year income). Fractile graphs were developed to facili-
tate comparisons of regression functions over alternative conditioning variables when the
conditioning variables have different distributions. Their estimation involves two stages.
The first involves calculating pi = Fˆt(xi), the (fractional) rank of observation i with first
period income xi.11
The second stage is estimation of the conditional mean function of the outcome of
interest non-parametrically conditional on the estimated fractional ranks, a problem for
which a number of alternative estimators are available (Sen, 2005). We use Cleveland’s
(1979) locally weighted regression (LOESS). LOESS involves determination of overlap-
ping local neighbourhoods around each of a series of points p spanning the range [0, 1],
and then using data for the sample observations that fall in each neighbourhood to esti-
mate by (weighted) regression the expected value of δ (x(p), y) at each p, denoted mˆ(p).
Local regression methods are appropriate in this setting because of their well-known
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good behaviour near the boundaries of the support of the data, unlike running means or
standard Nadaraya-Watson kernel regression estimators. The consistency of local regres-
sion estimators of fractile graphs is demonstrated by Sen (2005) who also analyzes their
asymptotic properties.12
We estimate mˆ(p) at 19 equally spaced points over the range of p (0.05, 0.10, ...,
0.95). Local neighbourhoods are defined as p ± 0.085 so that approximately 17 percent
of the sample falls in each neighbourhood.13 We estimate cumulative income growth
profiles by numerical integration of the LOESS estimates of the income growth profiles
using a trapezoidal rule (Press et al., 2007). A bandwidth p ± 0.085 was chosen for
estimation of mˆ(p) after experimentation. This choice is a compromise between not
under-smoothing the profiles and not over-smoothing the cumulative profiles (estimates
of cumulative income growth profiles are smoother than income growth profiles because
of the cumulation process). We use the same bandwidth for all time periods. Estimates
based on other bandwidths are available on request.
3.2 Resampling-based inference
The sampling variability of our estimates is computed using a non-parametric block
(panel) bootstrap procedure. This accounts for sample dependence that arises from the
longitudinal nature of the data – we use 16 waves of data from the BHPS corresponding to
survey years 1991–2006 (see the next section). Such procedures are outlined by Cameron
and Trivedi (2005, Chapter 11) but, as far as we are aware, they have not been applied
systematically in previous research on individual income growth issues.
Resampling is from the sample of households interviewed in wave 1 of the BHPS. The
full response history (including periods of non-participation if any) over BHPS waves 1–16
of all members of the selected households, plus their descendant split-off households and
all respondents that later joined these households, is then selected to form a bootstrap
replicate of the complete panel from waves 1 through 16. To deal with survey design
features (potentially small stratum sizes in particular), resampling from BHPS wave 1
households is done by cluster (primary sampling unit) within each sample stratum using
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the repeated half-sample bootstrap algorithm of Saigo et al. (2001).14 Let Xb denote one
bootstrap replication b of the full BHPS waves 1–16 sample, so constructed. Our analysis
examines changes over time in the distribution of income growth that we can observe in
the BHPS; we contrast income growth between four periods 1992–1996, 1995–1999, 1998–
2002 and 2001–2005. To preserve the dependence and overlapping membership of the four
subsamples associated with each period, it is only in a second step that subsamples for
each of the sub-periods compared are formed from the bootstrap replicates Xb of the full
panel (according to selection rules described in more detail below). Denote the replication
b subsample for period (t, t+ τ) by St(Xb).
All of the statistics of interest described in Section 2 (including coordinates of the
(cumulative) income growth profiles at any p) are then estimated on each replicate sub-
sample St(Xb) with b ∈ {1, 2, . . . , B}, where B = 999. We denote any such estimate θˆbt ≡
θ(St(Xb)). We also calculate the difference between the θˆbt for each of the three later peri-
ods (t, t+ τ) and that for the baseline period 1992–1996, ∆ˆbt ≡ θ(St(Xb))− θ(S1992(Xb)).
By computing all estimates for the four sub-periods and the between-period difference
statistics using the same sets of bootstrap replication, we capture the covariances between
different measures across time.
Our B replicates of θˆbt and ∆ˆbt are used to estimate the sampling error of our point
estimates θˆt and ∆ˆt, with the errors calculated as:
sˆ(θˆt) =
√√√√ 1
B − 1
B∑
b=1
(θˆbt − θ¯t)2 (9)
where θ¯t is the average of θˆbt over the B replications. Pointwise 95% variability bands are
calculated using the bias-corrected percentile method (Efron, 1981).
We also use our bootstrap replications ∆ˆbt to evaluate the statistical significance of the
sign of the observed changes over time. We do so by computing P(∆ˆt) = Pr[sgn(∆ˆbt) 6=
sgn(∆ˆt)] which we evaluate as
P(∆ˆt) = 1
B
B∑
b=1
1(sgn(∆ˆbt) 6= sgn(∆ˆt)) (10)
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where 1(·) evaluates to 1 if the expression in parentheses is true and 0 otherwise. P(∆ˆt)
gives the proportion of bootstrap replications for which the sign of ∆ˆbt is different from
the sign observed in the point estimates ∆ˆt. P(∆ˆt) can be understood as the smallest α
such that (1 − 2α) variability bands for ∆ˆt do not include zero. We interpret these as
giving the probability of incorrectly inferring the sign of the difference from the sign of
the point estimate of the difference.
We adopt similar procedures for assessing the statistical significance of the dominance
relations between (cumulative) income growth profiles. We base our tests of income
growth profile dominance of periodA (years t, t+τ) over the period B (years s, s+τ ; s > t),
on the statistic
MP(t, s) = min
p
[
mˆA(p)− mˆB(p)
]
(11)
and tests of cumulative income growth profile dominance on the statistic
CMP(t, s) = min
p
[
1
p
(∫ p
0
mˆA(q)dq −
∫ p
0
mˆB(q)dq
) ]
(12)
where p takes the values {0.05, 0.10, . . . , 0.95}. Income growth profile dominance for
period A over period B is established if MP(t, s) ≥ 0, and cumulative income growth
profile dominance if CMP(t, s) ≥ 0.
The MP(t, s) and CMP(t, s) statistics are similar to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov statis-
tics used in some tests of stochastic dominance. Adapting the unrestricted bootstrap
approach for stochastic dominance of Maasoumi and Heshmati (2000) to the analysis of
income growth profile dominance, we claim observed dominance relations to be statisti-
cally significant at the 100(1− α) percent confidence level if
(
1
B
B∑
b=1
1(MPb(t, s) < 0)
)
< α, (13)
that is, if the proportion of bootstrap replications in which dominance is not observed
(where it is observed in the original sample) is smaller than α.15 Cumulative income
growth profile dominance is checked similarly.
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4 BHPS data: definition of income and subsamples
We use data from waves 1–16 of the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), correspond-
ing to survey years 1991–2006.16 BHPS wave 1 is a nationally representative sample of
the population of Great Britain living in private households in 1991. Original sample
respondents (including each partner from a dissolved wave 1 partnership) have been fol-
lowed over time and they, and their co-residents, were interviewed annually. Children in
original sample households are also interviewed as adults when they reach the age of 16
years. The BHPS following rules ensure that the sample remains broadly representative
of the population of Britain over time.17
To assess whether patterns of income growth have changed over time, we report results
for four periods, i.e. for four values of t for pairs of years t and t+ τ . The first period is
1992–1996. We treat this period as a baseline against which we contrast three subsequent
periods: 1995–1999, 1998–2002, and 2001–2005.18 Our analysis sheds descriptive light
on the distribution of individual income growth and its progressivity, and how these
have been changing over time. We do not seek to identify causal effects associated with
particular policy reforms or particular governments in power at the time (Conservative
in the first period, Labour in the third and fourth periods).
Our measure of an individual’s income adheres as closely as possible to the ‘before
housing costs’ net household income definition that is used in the UK’s official income
statistics, the Households Below Average Income series.19
Income is the income of the household to which a person belongs, adjusted for dif-
ferences in household size and composition using an equivalence scale, and expressed in
constant prices. Specifically, income is ‘current net household income’, which is the sum
across all household members of cash income from work, capital income, private and
public transfers, minus direct taxes and occupational pension contributions. The income
reference period is the month prior to the interview or the most recent relevant period,
converted to a weekly equivalent pro rata.20 Total money income is equivalized using the
modified-OECD equivalence scale, and expressed in January 2008 pounds using a ‘before
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housing costs’ price index series supplied by the Department for Work and Pensions.
In order to reduce the potential impact on our estimates of measurement error and
transitory income fluctuations, each person’s income is measured using a three-year lon-
gitudinal average: an individual’s income measure for year t is the arithmetic average of
observed income for years t− 1, t, and t+ 1.21 Longitudinal averaging of an individual’s
income smooths out errors and other transitory variation if measurement errors are clas-
sical (see Appendix B). Also, to prevent outlier income values exerting undue influence,
analysis throughout is based on samples from which incomes in the top 1% and the bot-
tom 1% have been excluded (prior to taking three-year averages). Trimming of this kind
is common in analysis of income dynamics: see e.g. Gottschalk and Moffitt (2009).
Given these definitions, our sample for estimation of growth over the period 1992–
1996 is composed of respondents for whom income data are available for six survey years
(1991, 1992, 1993, and 1995, 1996, 1997), and similarly for the other three time periods.
The number of individuals in each subsample is: 6,088 (1992–1996), 6,130 (1995–1999),
5,789 (1998–2002), and 5,451 (2001–2005). Since the BHPS is an on-going panel survey,
each of the four subsamples corresponding to the four periods has an overlapping mem-
bership. If there were no missing data on income, no attrition (or death) and no panel
joiners (by coresidence or birth), each of the four sub-samples would comprise the same
set of respondents observed at different points in time. Although sample overlap is in-
complete in practice, there is dependence between the four subsamples and this needs to
be taken account when calculating the standard errors of estimates. We use the bootstrap
resampling algorithm discussed in Section 3.
Sample weights are used to compute all estimates. Our four longitudinal samples are
weighted using the BHPS cross-sectional enumerated individual weights of year t+τ . We
do not use the BHPS longitudinal weights because our analysis samples include sample
joiners, and no longitudinal weights are provided for them.
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5 Patterns of individual income growth in Britain and
their changes over time
In this section, we assess patterns of individual income growth in Britain over the 1990s
and 2000s using the methods developed earlier. We have also undertaken extensive sen-
sitivity analyses that confirm that our results are not driven by regression-to-the-mean
and measurement error, or by sample ageing and lifecycle income changes. For brevity,
these checks are reported in Appendix B and Appendix C.
5.1 Patterns of income growth: the longitudinal perspective
Figure 1 shows income growth profiles (left) and cumulative income growth profiles (right)
for the four time periods considered. The top two panels show income growth in absolute
terms (the units are January 2008 pounds) and the bottom two panels show income
growth in proportionate terms (the units are log January 2008 pounds). In all graphs,
vertical dashed lines are used to demarcate the poorest and richest fifths of each base-year
income distribution.
[Insert Figure 1 about here]
Income growth profiles are negatively-sloped, broadly speaking, regardless of whether
an absolute or proportionate definition of growth is used, and for each of the four periods
(albeit with a positive slope over some small ranges of p). That is, from a longitudinal
perspective, the pattern of individual income growth is progressive: the lower the rank
in the base-year distribution, the greater the expected income growth. Expected income
growth, absolute or proportionate, is positive for the majority of individuals, but negative
for individuals in the richest fifth in the base year.
The income growth profiles do not differ markedly across the four time periods. No
curve lies completely above another at all values of p, so there is no first order dominance
result. Taking all periods together, the estimates indicate that individuals starting in the
poorest fifth experience an income increase of approximately 15%–25% over the subse-
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quent four years, i.e. around £30–£50 per week. For those starting in the richest fifth,
the corresponding change is around –5%.
Differences between periods in patterns of income growth are more clear cut when
we consider cumulative income growth profiles, especially when individual growth is
measured in proportionate terms. The non-intersection of cumulative profiles suggests
second-order dominance results, and unambiguous rankings by all members of our class of
progressivity-adjusted growth measures. In the proportionate growth case, the ranking of
the distributions of income growth for the periods is, from highest to lowest, 1998–2002,
1995–1999, 1992–1996, and 2001–2005. In the absolute growth case, the same ranking
applies except that there is no dominance result concerning comparisons of 2001–2005
with 1995–1999 and 1992–1996: the cumulative profiles intersect in these cases.
These conclusions ignore sampling variability. Figures 2 and 3 show differences be-
tween the profile for 1992–1996 and each of the other three profiles, together with point-
wise bootstrapped 95% variability bands. In each figure, the top panel refers to income
growth profiles and the bottom panel to cumulative income growth profiles. Figure 2
refers to the absolute income growth case; Figure 3 refers to the proportionate income
growth case. The other feature that is summarized in each of the graphs is the difference
between periods in overall average individual income growth (the mean of the δi values,
δ¯), shown as a horizontal dashed line. This provides an additional reference point for
assessing change over time (see the discussion in Section 2).
The relatively large variability bands for the pointwise differences in profiles in many
cases, combined with their overlap with the reference point of zero, might suggest that we
are unlikely to find MP and CMP dominance, and we check this shortly using the methods
explained earlier. (Overall profile dominance does not require that variability bands lie
wholly above zero at every value of p.) Notwithstanding these remarks, cumulative
profile differences and proportionate growth income growth generally provide more clear
cut results generally. The difference curves and associated variability bands lie above
zero at all values of p in Figure 3(e). This pattern implies that individual income growth
was distinctively more progressive – and more pro-poor, specifically – in the 1998–2002
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period than in 1992–1996. The comparisons between each of the other two periods and
1992–1996 do not stand out in this way.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
[Insert Figure 3 about here]
The patterns just described are confirmed by the test statistics MP and CMP for as-
sessing overall dominance. The statistics estimated for all 12 possible dominance compar-
isons across the four sub-periods examined are reported in Table 1. Remember MP(t, s)
and CMP(t, s) give the smallest difference between the income growth profiles (or cumula-
tive profile) for periods t and s over 19 equally spaced percentile ranks at which the profiles
are estimated. Dominance of period t profile over period s profile therefore corresponds
to a positive value for MP(t, s) or CMP(t, s). Income growth profile (first order) dom-
inance is never observed in our samples: all statistics are negative. Cumulative income
growth profile dominance (second order) is observed in 10 pairwise comparisons. These
correspond to the cells in Table 1 with positive entries (emboldened to highlight them).
These refer to dominance of 1998–2002 over all three other periods (for both absolute
and proportionate changes), for 1995–1999 over 1992–1996 (for both absolute and propor-
tionate changes) and over 2001–2005 (for proportionate changes) and for 1992–1996 over
2001–2005 (for proportionate changes). However, for dominance to be statistically signif-
icant there has to be dominance across virtually all bootstrap replications (see earlier).
Only three of the ten dominance results satisfy this criterion: dominance of 1998–2002
over 1992–1996 for both measures of income change and dominance of 1998–2002 over
2001–2005 for proportionate change.
[Insert Table 1 here]
We now put numerical flesh on the patterns that we have graphed. The upper panel
of Table 2 reports, for each period, average income in the initial and final years, and
average income growth over the period for the population as a whole. (The average
growth estimates are estimates of the progressivity-adjusted growth index Υv with v = 1,
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i.e. δ.) The lower panel reports, for each statistic, the difference between the value for each
of the three later periods and the 1992–1996 reference period. Corresponding estimates
are shown in the middle and right-hand panels for individuals who were in the poorest
fifth or the richest fifth in the relevant base year.
Table 2 confirms that average income growth for the population as a whole increased
in each period, and in both absolute terms (from £15 to £25) and proportionate terms
(from 5% to 8%) until 1998–2002. Income growth then fell to a level similar to that for
the initial reference period; indeed, to a lower level in the proportionate growth case (£14
or 3%).
In every period, those who started in the poorest fifth had larger income gains than
average (e.g. £35 compared to £15 in 1992–1996), and substantially larger gains than
those who started in the richest fifth who experienced negative income growth in all
periods (e.g. –£19 in 1992–1996). The contrasts between the income change of the poorest
and richest fifths were largest for the 1998–2002 period. This is a manifestation of the
greater progressivity of income growth that we highlighted earlier. We summarize this
progressivity using the progressivity-adjusted growth indices Υv shortly.
The greater income gains for those starting in the bottom fifth are not sufficiently large
to enable them to catch up with the richest fifth but the gap between them is reduced
substantially. The ratio of the mean income of the richest fifth to the mean income of
the poorest fifth in the base year ranges from 3.9 (441/113 in 1992) to 3.4 (508/149 in
2001) whereas the final-year ratios of mean income for the same two groups range from
2.9 (422/147 in 1996) to 2.6 (488/189 in 2005). Put differently, initial mean income
differences between the richest fifth and the poorest fifth are reduced by approximately
a quarter because income growth is progressive.
These calculations summarize income changes for groups defined by base-year income
position, but income groups change their composition over time. Information about
the prevalence of changes in income group composition is provided in the two columns
labelled ‘% move’ in Table 2. The statistics show the proportion of individuals in a base-
year income group (poorest fifth; richest fifth) that are not in that group in the final year.
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There is an interesting symmetry: in each period, the fraction of individuals moving from
the poorest fifth, or moving from the richest fifth, is the same – around one third. This is
a relatively large proportion, and its size underscores the potential importance of taking
a longitudinal perspective.
[Insert Table 2 here]
Income growth patterns are summarized further in Table 3 using our progressivity-
adjusted growth indices (Υv) and return-to-progressivity indices (Gv). Estimates for each
period are shown in the top panel of the table, with the absolute growth measures to the
left and proportionate growth measures to the right. We vary the progressivity-sensitivity
parameter v from 2 (linear Gini-like weights) to 4 (placing greater weight on gains for
initially-poorer individuals). It turns out that all the estimates of Υv suggest the same
trend over time. Progressivity-adjusted growth in every period was higher in each period
than the preceding one, except in the final period when it fell. This was also the trend
shown by the ‘mean growth’ estimates reported in Table 2 – these correspond to the case
Υ1.
Summaries of the differences in indices (relative to 1992–1996 values) are shown in the
bottom panel of the table. The middle set of differences estimates, for 1998–2002, cor-
respond to the case for which we found statistically significant second-order dominance.
For this period, the difference in each index is large compared to the corresponding differ-
ence for other periods, and the associated ‘p-value’ is very small. Varying v makes little
difference to the estimates. For each v, income growth is about £11, or 4%, and larger
in 1998–2002 than in 1992–1996. The lack of variation in the difference estimates with
changes in v is also a feature of the comparisons for the other two periods. Observe, how-
ever, that the estimated differences involving 2001–2005 are near zero and lack statistical
significance, whereas the corresponding estimates for 1995–1999 are also positive.
The larger estimates of Υv for 1998–2002 partly reflect the greater average growth
in this period reported in Table 2 and partly reflect greater growth progressivity. The
estimates of Gv isolate the latter component. The return-to-progressivity is positive for
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all periods, and significantly so. But the differences in Gv between periods are less marked
and never significant.
[Insert Table 3 here]
6 Concluding remarks
We have argued that analysis of the pattern of income growth, and its changes over
time, should employ longitudinal perspectives to complement conventional repeated cross-
section approaches. It is of interest to know how the incomes of specific individuals change
over time, not only how the incomes associated with Parade positions (income ‘slots’)
change over time. We have therefore developed methods that relate configurations of
income growth profiles to unanimous orderings by aggregate measures of progressivity-
adjusted income growth. For statistical inference, we have shown how to apply bootstrap
resampling methods that take account of the dependent clustered samples that are in-
herent in this type of analysis.
Our estimates for four four-year periods in recent British history suggest that, from
a longitudinal perspective, income growth is generally progressive. Over any particular
period, income growth is greater for those with lower incomes in the base-year distribu-
tion. This is not an artefact of measurement error or sample ageing. This pattern is quite
different from the picture provided by growth incidence curves (a repeated cross-section
perspective): broadly speaking, they suggest that income growth over a four-year period
has been typically been regressive in terms of absolute income changes though more dis-
tributionally neutral in terms of proportionate income changes. For further discussion,
see Jenkins and Van Kerm (2011).
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Notes
1Whereas Ahluwalia and Chenery (1974) referred only to weights that differed by (in-
come quantile) group, Klasen (1994) is clear that the welfare weights could be individual-
specific if one has unit-record data available.
2Bourguignon’s (2011) empirical illustration compares a counterfactual growth process
with the observed growth process for a set of countries in the global income distribution,
and so the base-year distributions are identical, by construction.
3Weaker conditions are available for a narrower class of SWFs (class V3), but the
properties are harder to interpret, and may not command wide agreement: Bourguignon’s
(2011) third result, providing second-order dominance conditions, requires restrictions on
a particular third-order derivative of the utility function.
4We discuss the welfare content of Υ and our distributionally-sensitive measures fur-
ther in Appendix A.
5These are commonly-used ways of summarizing income growth, but not the only pos-
sibilities, e.g. a parametric class of scale-invariant growth distance functions is (2β/β)(yβ−
xβ)/(x + y)β, β 6= 0, which is the ‘arc percentage’ divided by 100 in the case β = 1. A
translation-invariant class is (21−γ/γ)[exp(γy)−exp(γx)]/[exp(γx)+exp(γy)], γ 6= 0. The
limiting cases of β = 0 and γ = 0 are the proportionate and absolute growth distance
functions cited in the text. We could also have considered the case of ‘true’ proportionate
growth, defined as (y − x)/x.
6If δ (λx, λy)= δ(x, y), δ is the Fields and Ok (1999) index of directional income
movement with c = 1.
7Most income mobility indices, regardless of mobility concept, can be written in the
form shown by equations (3)–(6) (Jenkins and Van Kerm, 2009, Van Kerm, 2009).
8See Van Kerm (2006, 2009) for further discussion and illustrations. The income
growth profile is labelled mobility profile by Van Kerm (2009). Grimm (2007) indepen-
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dently proposed a similar device.
9Classical measurement error and transitory variability in incomes impart a negative
slope to income growth profiles. We address this regression-to-the-mean issue in substan-
tial detail in Appendix B.
10Since the first version of our paper (Jenkins and Van Kerm, 2011), Palmisano and
Van de gaer (2013) have provided an axiomatic characterisation of these indices.
11Since individual income data typically contain ties (e.g. because members of the
same household are generally assigned identical disposable income), we recommend use
of estimators for the cumulative distribution function that assign equal rank for equal
income. See e.g. Chotikapanich and Griffiths (2001).
12We have also undertaken Monte-Carlo simulation analysis using a data generation
process that mimicks the joint distribution of household income and size and year-on-
year dependence in incomes that appears in the panel data we use below. The analysis
confirms that the estimators adopted are consistent and that the bootstrap methods for
inference (described below) lead to confidence intervals with good coverage probability.
Our simulation results prompted us to adopt a second order polynomial in the LOESS
procedure which have better behaviour near the boundary of the support of p than a
standard first order polynomial. Details are available from the authors.
13LOESS differs from other local polynomial regression estimators (Fan and Gijbels,
1996) in the definition of the neighbourhood. LOESS uses a nearest neighbour approach
that selects a fixed proportion of the sample around each grid point. Local polynomial
regression typically uses a kernel-based neighbourhood of fixed width around grid points.
In our application the two approaches are equivalent since the δi are regressed on ranks pi
that are, by definition, uniformly distributed, and so a fixed fraction of the data falls into
neighbourhoods of fixed width. In Jenkins and Van Kerm (2011), we report results based
on a ‘robust’ LOESS approach (Cleveland, 1979) that aims to protect against the effects
of outlying observations on conditional mean estimates. The findings are very similar to
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those reported here.
14The repeated half-sample bootstrap algorithm is also versatile as it has been demon-
strated to lead to valid bootstrap inference with both smooth and non-smooth statistics
(Saigo et al., 2001). We use the Stata package rhsbsample for generating the replication
weights (Van Kerm, 2013).
15We are in effect testing a null hypothesis of dominance against an alternative of non-
dominance. Alternative approaches such as permutation tests or restricted bootstrap
tests used in stochastic dominance analysis which allow tests of the null hypothesis of
non-dominance are difficult to apply here given the complex dependence of the subsamples
compared.
16 When we began our research, BHPS net income data were available for 16 waves
only. The BHPS ended in 2008. We have also undertaken analysis using the full 18-wave
data set, but it does not change the conclusions reported below.
17The BHPS is less representative of immigrant groups arriving in Britain after 1991.
We do not use data from the extension samples for Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland
that began in the late 1990s because it would require use of complicated probability
weighting schemes and the temporal coverage of the data is relatively short. For detailed
discussion of the BHPS and its income data, see Jenkins (2010).
18Our conclusions are not substantially affected by the specific choices of the periods
for which results are reported. This is confirmed by calculations based on rolling four-year
windows for the entire period (results not reported for brevity).
19BHPS net income data files are an unofficial supplement to the official BHPS release,
and documented by Levy and Jenkins (2012) and Jenkins (2010). Jenkins (2010) shows
that BHPS cross-sectional income distributions closely match HBAI ones. For more
details of the HBAI definition of income, see Department for Work and Pensions (2008).
20The use of a current rather than annual measure of income is standard in Britain.
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Böheim and Jenkins (2006) show that the BHPS current and annual income measures
provide very similar estimates of distributional summary statistics.
21The use of three-year averaged income follows Gottschalk and Danziger (2001) and
Jenkins and Van Kerm (2006). Use of single-year non-averaged incomes provides quali-
tatively similar results to those reported below.
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Figure 1. Income growth profiles and cumulative income growth profiles
Note. Top panel shows absolute growth (change in real income, pounds); bottom panel shows
proportionate growth (change in log real income).
34
In
co
m
e
gr
ow
th
pr
ofi
le
s
(a
)
19
95
–1
99
9
vs
.1
99
2–
19
96
-1
00-5
0050
Income growth difference
0
0.
10
0.
30
0.
50
0.
70
0.
90
1
In
iti
al
 fr
ac
tio
na
l r
an
k,
 p
(b
)
19
98
–2
00
2
vs
.1
99
2–
19
96
-1
00-5
0050
Income growth difference
0
0.
10
0.
30
0.
50
0.
70
0.
90
1
In
iti
al
 fr
ac
tio
na
l r
an
k,
 p
(c
)
20
01
–2
00
5
vs
.1
99
2–
19
96
-1
00-5
0050
Income growth difference
0
0.
10
0.
30
0.
50
0.
70
0.
90
1
In
iti
al
 fr
ac
tio
na
l r
an
k,
 p
C
um
ul
at
iv
e
in
co
m
e
gr
ow
th
pr
ofi
le
s
(d
)
19
95
–1
99
9
vs
.1
99
2–
19
96
-2
002040
Income growth difference
0
0.
10
0.
30
0.
50
0.
70
0.
90
1
In
iti
al
 fr
ac
tio
na
l r
an
k,
 p
(e
)
19
98
–2
00
2
vs
.1
99
2–
19
96
-2
002040
Income growth difference
0
0.
10
0.
30
0.
50
0.
70
0.
90
1
In
iti
al
 fr
ac
tio
na
l r
an
k,
 p
(f
)
20
01
–2
00
5
vs
.1
99
2–
19
96
-2
002040
Income growth difference
0
0.
10
0.
30
0.
50
0.
70
0.
90
1
In
iti
al
 fr
ac
tio
na
l r
an
k,
 p
F
ig
ur
e
2.
D
iff
er
en
ce
s
in
in
co
m
e
gr
ow
th
pr
ofi
le
s
(r
el
at
iv
e
to
19
92
–1
99
6)
,w
ith
95
%
po
in
tw
ise
va
ria
bi
lit
y
ba
nd
s:
ab
so
lu
te
in
co
m
e
gr
ow
th
(c
ha
ng
e
in
re
al
in
co
m
e,
po
un
ds
)
N
ot
e.
T
he
ho
riz
on
ta
ld
as
he
d
lin
e
in
ea
ch
gr
ap
h
sh
ow
s
th
e
be
tw
ee
n-
pe
rio
d
di
ffe
re
nc
e
in
th
e
ov
er
al
la
ve
ra
ge
gr
ow
th
ra
te
(δ
).
35
In
co
m
e
gr
ow
th
pr
ofi
le
s
(a
)
19
95
–1
99
9
vs
.1
99
2–
19
96
-.2-.10.1.2.3
Income growth difference
0
0.
10
0.
30
0.
50
0.
70
0.
90
1
In
iti
al
 fr
ac
tio
na
l r
an
k,
 p
(b
)
19
98
–2
00
2
vs
.1
99
2–
19
96
-.2-.10.1.2.3
Income growth difference
0
0.
10
0.
30
0.
50
0.
70
0.
90
1
In
iti
al
 fr
ac
tio
na
l r
an
k,
 p
(c
)
20
01
–2
00
5
vs
.1
99
2–
19
96
-.2-.10.1.2.3
Income growth difference
0
0.
10
0.
30
0.
50
0.
70
0.
90
1
In
iti
al
 fr
ac
tio
na
l r
an
k,
 p
C
um
ul
at
iv
e
in
co
m
e
gr
ow
th
pr
ofi
le
s
(d
)
19
95
–1
99
9
vs
.1
99
2–
19
96
-.10.1.2.3
Income growth difference
0
0.
10
0.
30
0.
50
0.
70
0.
90
1
In
iti
al
 fr
ac
tio
na
l r
an
k,
 p
(e
)
19
98
–2
00
2
vs
.1
99
2–
19
96
-.10.1.2.3
Income growth difference
0
0.
10
0.
30
0.
50
0.
70
0.
90
1
In
iti
al
 fr
ac
tio
na
l r
an
k,
 p
(f
)
20
01
–2
00
5
vs
.1
99
2–
19
96
-.10.1.2.3
Income growth difference
0
0.
10
0.
30
0.
50
0.
70
0.
90
1
In
iti
al
 fr
ac
tio
na
l r
an
k,
 p
F
ig
ur
e
3.
D
iff
er
en
ce
s
in
in
co
m
e
gr
ow
th
pr
ofi
le
s
(r
el
at
iv
e
to
19
92
–1
99
6)
,w
ith
95
%
po
in
tw
ise
va
ria
bi
lit
y
ba
nd
s:
pr
op
or
tio
na
te
in
co
m
e
gr
ow
th
(c
ha
ng
e
in
lo
g
re
al
in
co
m
e)
N
ot
e.
T
he
ho
riz
on
ta
ld
as
he
d
lin
e
in
ea
ch
gr
ap
h
sh
ow
s
th
e
be
tw
ee
n-
pe
rio
d
di
ffe
re
nc
e
in
th
e
ov
er
al
la
ve
ra
ge
gr
ow
th
ra
te
(δ
).
36
Table 1: MP and CMP statistics for dominance checks across sub-periods with bootstrap
confidence intervals and p-values
Income growth Log income growth
First order Second order First order Second order
MP(t, s) CMP(t, s) MP(t, s) CMP(t, s)
Dominance statistics for 2001-2005 (period t) over ...
1992-1996 (period s) –16 –1 –0.06 –0.03
(–19 ; 9) (–6 ; 5) (–0.06 ; –0.04) (–0.07 ; 0.01)
[1.000] [0.785] [1.000] [0.997]
1995-1999 (period s) –33 –10 –0.11 –0.06
(–41 ; 16) (–15 ; –4) (–0.13 ; –0.07) (–0.12 ; –0.03)
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
1998-2002 (period s) –29 –16 –0.15 –0.15
(–33 ; 22) (–26 ; –8) (–0.20 ; –0.10) (–0.21 ; –0.08)
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
Dominance statistics for 1998-2002 (period t) over ...
1992-1996 (period s) –15 10∗ –0.02 0.03∗
(–37 ; 0) (7 ; 15) (–0.04 ; 0.01) (0.01 ; 0.05)
[0.992] [0.000] [0.997] [0.003]
1995-1999 (period s) –37 1 –0.06 0.01
(–63 ; 17) (–3 ; 6) (–0.09 ; –0.01) (–0.01 ; 0.03)
[1.000] [0.257] [1.000] [0.171]
2001-2005 (period s) –16 7 –0.02 0.05∗
(–33 ; 0) (1 ; 16) (–0.04 ; 0.01) (0.03 ; 0.07)
[0.999] [0.070] [0.987] [0.000]
Dominance statistics for 1995-1999 (period t) over ...
1992-1996 (period s) –2 2 –0.03 0.02
(1 ; 2) (–3 ; 8) (–0.03 ; –0.01) (–0.01 ; 0.04)
[0.996] [0.329] [1.000] [0.245]
1998-2002 (period s) –17 –16 –0.08 –0.08
(–20 ; 11) (–30 ; –6) (–0.13 ; –0.04) (–0.17 ; –0.02)
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000] [0.998]
2001-2005 (period s) –9 –4 –0.04 0.04
(–14 ; 1) (–13 ; 6) (–0.08 ; 0.01) (0.01 ; 0.06)
[1.000] [0.851] [0.993] [0.047]
Dominance statistics for 1992-1996 (period t) over ...
1995-1999 (period s) –30 –9 –0.07 –0.03
(–42 ; 14) (–13 ; –3) (–0.07 ; –0.04) (–0.07 ; 0.00)
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000] [0.998]
1998-2002 (period s) –21 –21 –0.12 –0.12
(–21 ; 15) (–33 ; –12) (–0.18 ; –0.07) (–0.19 ; –0.05)
[1.000] [1.000] [1.000] [1.000]
2001-2005 (period s) –15 –8 –0.03 0.02
(–18 ; 7) (–16 ; 1) (–0.05 ; –0.01) (–0.02 ; 0.04)
[1.000] [0.981] [1.000] [0.362]
Notes: For each comparison, the table reports point estimates for the MP and CMP statistics; a positive value
indicates dominance in the sample (emboldened to highlight them). Bootstrap 95 percent confidence intervals for
MP and CMP are reported in parentheses. Figures in square brackets give the proportion p of bootstrap replications
in which we do not observe dominance (asterisks mark instances with p < 0.01).
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Appendix A The welfare content of distributionally-sensitive
growth measures
Appendix A.1 Υ as an Atkinson-Bourguignon SWF
As explained in Section 2, our income growth evaluation function differs from an Atkinson-
Bourguignon bivariate SWF in that we focus on the evaluation of income growth. This is
distinct from the overall evaluation of the bivariate welfare of an Atkinson-Bourguignon
SWF: comparisons of growth distributions according to Υ need not necessarily be con-
sistent with comparisons according to W . However, as demonstrated by Bourguignon
(2011), the distinction is unimportant if one is able to restrict comparisons to bivariate
distributions that have identical base-period incomes. In this case, evaluation according
to W is essentially the same as an evaluation of the income change distribution (with
initial incomes given).
The evaluation Υ combined with a directional δ function and positive w can then be
interpreted as a special case of the generic families of welfare functions V1 considered in
Bourguignon (2011). His first-order dominance conditions therefore apply to Υ. Consid-
ering δ(x, y) = y − x and further restricting w to be non-increasing, Υ defines a special
case of welfare function belonging to V2 and Bourguignon’s second-order dominance con-
ditions apply. It is also a member of V3, except that it is a limiting case that restricts
the second derivative of the individual utility function vyy with respect to second-period
income to be equal to zero. This means that inequality in second-period incomes con-
ditional on first-period income does not affect overall welfare according to the resulting
W .
The assumption that inequality in second-period incomes conditional on first-period
income does not influence social evaluation is not exceptional in the context of mobility
measurement. For example, Bénabou and Ok (2001) state that “(W)e are interested in
mobility as an equalizer of ex-ante opportunities (or welfare), not of ex-post outcomes.
Thus (...) our concern is not whether future realized income distributions will be more or
less equal than the current one. They could be much more unequal, but if this primarily
1
reflects shocks which were unpredictable on the basis of initial conditions there is little
disparity of opportunity.” (p. 2). One can also interpret this standpoint in the context of
an Atkinson-Bourguignon SWF where second-period income is replaced by the expecta-
tion of second-period income conditional on base-period income in the individual utility
functions, v(x, y¯x) = v(x, x + δ¯x) = u(x, δ¯x). This idea is similar to the modification of
the Atkinson-Bourguignon SWF proposed by Gottschalk and Spolaore (2002).
Appendix A.2 Υ and welfare change from an ex ante perspective
The formulation just described of social welfare measurement from an ex ante perspective
as advocated in Bénabou and Ok (2001) leads to further social welfare content for the Υ
measure.
The normative content of the index of Υ(H) can be linked in a straightforward way to
linear, rank-dependent (or ‘Yaari’) social welfare functions (Yaari, 1987, 1988, Lambert,
2001). According to a Yaari SWF, the level of social welfare associated with a random
variable with distribution function F is given by the functional
V (F ) =
∫ 1
0
w(p)F−1(p)dp. (14)
Accordingly, VX ≡ V (FX) and VY ≡ V (FY ) denote the level of (cross-section) social
welfare in the initial and final period respectively. The welfare growth between the two
periods is
∆V = VY − VX (15)
Let us now define y¯X(x) = E (y|X = x), the expected second-period income given
initial income x. Define now F¯Y as the distribution function of this expected second period
income. Accordingly, V¯Y ≡ V (F¯Y ) is the social welfare associated with the distribution
of expected second-period incomes,
V (F¯Y ) =
∫ 1
0
w(p)F¯−1Y (p)dp. (16)
2
Observe that we focus here on V (F¯Y ) which differs from the actual welfare level in the
second period V (FY ) by the degree to which income is dispersed around its expected
value. The difference between base-period welfare and expected final-period welfare is
given by
∆¯V = V¯Y − VX (17)
=
∫ 1
0
w(p)F¯−1Y (p)dp− VX (18)
=
∫ 1
0
w(p)F¯−1Y (p)dp−
∫ 1
0
w(p)F−1X (p)dp (19)
∆¯V is the statistic of interest for Bénabou and Ok (2001) who interpret it as an indication
of the progressivity of the growth process and a measure of equalization of opportunities.
The connection between ∆¯V and Υ(H) is immediate:
Proposition A1 For δ(x, y) = y − x, ∆¯V = Υ(H) if y¯X(x) is monotone increasing in
x.
Proposition A1 states that if expected second-period income is increasing in initial income—
which means that an individual’s rank remains the same in the distribution of initial-
period incomes and in the distribution of expected second-period incomes—then Υ(H)
captures the welfare gain in the distribution of expected second period incomes com-
pared to welfare in the initial distribution. Under this condition, an increase in Υ(H)
unambiguously increases expected future welfare. (The proof of Proposition A1 derives
trivially from the invariance properties of quantiles under monotonic transformations.)
The monotonicity property is described in Shaked and Shanthikumar (2007, chapter 1)
and is simply assumed by Bénabou and Ok (2001) who claim that ‘[e]mpirical plausibil-
ity requires that future income prospects increase smoothly with the current level, in the
sense of first order stochastic dominance’ (p.3).
Appendix A.3 Υ and intertemporal welfare from an ex ante perspec-
tive
The arguments can be extended in a straightforward manner to intertemporal welfare.
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Consider now the distribution of the sum of initial and final period incomes (z = x+y),
FXY (y), and the social welfare associated with it, VXY ≡ V (FXY ).1
Define F¯XY as the distribution function of expected total (or permanent) income: first
period income plus expected second period income, z¯X(x) = x + y¯X(x). V¯XY ≡ V (F¯XY )
is the social welfare associated to the distribution of total income as expected from period
1.
We can now express the welfare gain induced by the pattern of expected income
growth in comparison with a replication of the status quo (i.e. if everyone were to retain
the same income income: x = y and z = 2x):
Γ¯V = V¯XY − 2VX (20)
=
∫ 1
0
w(p)
(
F¯−1Y (p) + x(p)
)
dp−
∫ 1
0
w(p)2x(p) dp (21)
=
∫ 1
0
w(p)
(
F¯−1Y (p)− x(p)
)
dp (22)
The relationship between Γ¯V and Υ is as follows:
Proposition A2 For δ(x, y) = y − x, Γ¯V = Υ(H) if z¯X(x) is monotone increasing in
x.
Proposition A2 states that if z¯X(x) (or equivalently x(p)+m(p)) is monotonically increas-
ing in x—which means that an individual’s rank remains the same in the distribution
of initial-period incomes and in the distribution of expected total income—then Υ(H)
captures the welfare gain of expected income growth in the distribution of expected
inter-temporal welfare compared to welfare in the status quo distribution.2 An increase
in Υ(H) therefore unambiguously enhances welfare in expected permanent income. As a
corollary,
Corollary A1 For δ(x, y) = y − x, −m′(p;δ)
x′(p) < 2 for all p ∈ [0, 1] implies Γ¯V = Υ(H).
This corollary relates the monotonicity condition to a condition on the relative slopes of
the income growth profile and the initial period quantile function.
Proposition A2 and Corollary A1 derive straightforwardly from the monotonicity as-
sumption and the invariance of quantiles under monotonic transformations. We know
4
that
Γ¯V =
∫ 1
0
w(p)F¯XY −1(p)dp− 2VX
If δ(x, y) = y − x, m(FX(x); δ) = y¯X(x) − x. After a change of variable p = FX(x):
m(p; δ) = y¯X(x(p)) − x(p) = z¯X(x(p)) − 2x(p) where x(p) = F−1X (p) is the quantile
function of initial period incomes. Therefore
Υ(H) =
∫ 1
0
w(p)m(p; δ) dp
=
∫ 1
0
w(p) (z¯X(x(p))− 2x(p)) dp
=
∫ 1
0
w(p) z¯X(x(p)) dp− 2
∫ 1
0
w(p)x(p) dp
=
∫ 1
0
w(p) z¯X(x(p)) dp− 2VX .
The invariance property of quantiles under monotonic transformations implies F¯−1XY (p) =
z¯X(x(p)) and therefore increasing monotonicity of z¯X(x) implies increasing monotonicity
in z¯X(x(p)) and therefore
Υ(H) =
∫ 1
0
w(p) F¯−1XY (p) dp− 2VX
= V¯XY − 2VX
= Γ¯V
Increasing monotonicity in z¯X(x(p)) can be empirically assessed from the sign of its
first derivative for any p, which can be expressed in terms of the derivatives of both the
base-period quantile function and of the income growth profile:
z¯′X(x(p)) > 0
⇔ (m(p; δ) + 2x(p))′ > 0
⇔ m′(p; δ) > −2x′(p)
⇔ −m
′(p; δ)
x′(p) < 2
5
So−m′(p;δ)
x′(p) < 2 for any p implies increasing monotonicity of z¯X(x(p)) which by Proposition
A2 leads to Corollary A1 that Γ¯V = Υ(H).
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Appendix B Regression to the mean and measurement
error
It might be argued that the negative slopes of our income growth profiles are simply
due to regression to the mean. The reasoning is that if there is classical measurement
error (errors uncorrelated with the true value and over time), then the expected income
increase for someone with a below-average income is positive and is negative for someone
with above-average income.3 Hence, some of the observed progressivity in income growth
evidenced in the income growth profiles may be spurious. Our use of a three-year income
average aims to reduce the impact of this problem by smoothing out measurement errors
(and transitory variability) so that the economically substantive variations are better
monitored. (As it happens, use of single-year incomes led to broadly similar findings but
with steeper income growth curves at extreme ranks.) One response to the regression to
the mean argument is that it is not so relevant to comparisons of patterns over time. There
is no change e.g. in the BHPS design that leads us to expect the nature of measurement
error to have varied over time. A bias in the profile slope may be consistent with no bias in
the estimated difference between profiles. Another response to the classical measurement
error argument is that, in reality, measurement error may not be classical. Gottschalk
and Huynh (2010) argue persuasively that factors such as mean reversion in errors offset
biases arising from the variance inflation aspect of measurement error, so that bias in
measures of mobility may be negligible.4
Validation data are not available to us to examine this issue, and so our investigations
of the impact of measurement error employed two other strategies. The first is a procedure
analogous to an instrumental variables (IV) approach to reduce the impact of measure-
ment errors. The second focuses on samples with more reliably-measured incomes. We
discuss these in turn.
Our ‘IV’ approach uses definitions of income and income growth that break the link
between measurement error in base-year income level and in income growth, thereby
offsetting any regression-to-the-mean driven by classical measurement error. We approx-
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imate individual base-year ranks, Ft(yit), by F˜t(y˜it) where F˜t is the distribution function of
y˜it = yit−1 +yit+1. The idea is to use income lags and leads to approximate current period
income and to derive base-year income rankings from this. We consider income change
of the form δ (yit, yit+τ ;H) where yis is income for year s (not a three-year smoothed
average). These definitions imply that no data are used simultaneously to determine
base-year rank and income change; it is as if people’s ranks in the distribution of lag and
lead incomes are used as instruments for their ranks in the distribution of current-year
income.
Estimates employing the instrumented base-year ranks are presented in Appendix
Figures B1, B2, and B3. The results are similar to those reported earlier. There is
clear progressivity of income growth: income growth profiles remain negatively sloped.5
The estimated trends over time are also reassuringly similar to those reported earlier,
including the distinctive pro-poor nature of the 1998–2002 period. Table B1 shows all
dominance results. All qualitative results are maintained, with similar levels of statistical
significance.
Our second strategy is to recalculate our estimates using subsamples for which we
believe incomes are better measured. The first subsample is our main sample but ex-
cluding individuals belonging to a household in which at least one person is in full-time
self-employment. The second subsample drops instead individuals belonging to house-
holds with income components imputed by BHPS staff because of item non-response.
(We also employed a third subsample excluded both individuals in households with self-
employment and also those with imputed incomes, but subsample numbers were pro-
hibitively small.) Self-employment income is notoriously difficult to capture reliably in
surveys. Imputations lead to measurement error because of prediction error: to the ex-
tent that income is imputed in the final or initial year of a period, imputation is likely
to lead to error in measurement of income change over time. One issue with the sub-
sample strategy is that it can lead to substantial reductions in sample size. For example,
dropping individuals from households with self-employed workers (in either the base or
final year of each period) leads to reduction in sample size of about 20%–25%. Dropping
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Figure B1. Income income growth profiles with proxied base year rank and no three-year-
average smoothing
Note. Top panel shows absolute growth (change in real income in pounds); bottom panel
shows proportionate growth (change in log real income).
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Table B1: MP and CMP statistics for dominance checks across sub-periods with boot-
strap confidence intervals and p-values (with proxied base year rank and no three-year
smoothing)
Income growth Log income growth
First order Second order First order Second order
MP(t, s) CMP(t, s) MP(t, s) CMP(t, s)
Dominance statistics for 2001-2005 (period t) over ...
1992-1996 (period s) –15 1 –0.06 –0.02
(–18 ; 7) (–14 ; 15) (–0.06 ; –0.03) (–0.11 ; 0.05)
[1.000] [0.393] [1.000] [0.682]
1995-1999 (period s) –25 –2 –0.11 –0.04
(–28 ; 15) (–17 ; 11) (–0.13 ; –0.05) (–0.12 ; 0.04)
[1.000] [0.611] [1.000] [0.827]
1998-2002 (period s) –24 –17 –0.13 –0.13
(–27 ; 15) (–32 ; –3) (–0.18 ; –0.09) (–0.21 ; –0.05)
[1.000] [0.988] [1.000] [0.999]
Dominance statistics for 1998-2002 (period t) over ...
1992-1996 (period s) –20 18 –0.05 0.11∗
(–43 ; 4) (1 ; 33) (–0.08 ; 0.00) (0.01 ; 0.19)
[0.999] [0.013] [0.999] [0.008]
1995-1999 (period s) –21 15 –0.06 0.09
(–28 ; 10) (–2 ; 29) (–0.07 ; –0.03) (0.00 ; 0.18)
[1.000] [0.039] [1.000] [0.020]
2001-2005 (period s) –30 17 –0.07 0.13∗
(–59 ; 10) (3 ; 32) (–0.13 ; –0.02) (0.05 ; 0.21)
[0.999] [0.012] [0.999] [0.001]
Dominance statistics for 1995-1999 (period t) over ...
1992-1996 (period s) –5 3 –0.01 0.01
(–6 ; 0) (–13 ; 18) (–0.01 ; 0.00) (–0.07 ; 0.10)
[1.000] [0.301] [0.998] [0.363]
1998-2002 (period s) –18 –15 –0.10 –0.10
(–20 ; 12) (–30 ; 1) (–0.15 ; –0.05) (–0.18 ; 0.00)
[1.000] [0.961] [1.000] [0.981]
2001-2005 (period s) –21 2 –0.04 0.03
(–48 ; 5) (–11 ; 16) (–0.09 ; 0.01) (–0.04 ; 0.11)
[1.000] [0.401] [0.991] [0.178]
Dominance statistics for 1992-1996 (period t) over ...
1995-1999 (period s) –21 –4 –0.09 –0.01
(–21 ; 15) (–18 ; 12) (–0.10 ; –0.07) (–0.10 ; 0.08)
[1.000] [0.708] [1.000] [0.640]
1998-2002 (period s) –24 –18 –0.11 –0.11
(–28 ; 14) (–34 ; –1) (–0.13 ; –0.06) (–0.20 ; –0.02)
[1.000] [0.988] [1.000] [0.993]
2001-2005 (period s) –28 –1 –0.08 0.02
(–48 ; 12) (–16 ; 14) (–0.12 ; –0.02) (–0.05 ; 0.11)
[1.000] [0.613] [1.000] [0.320]
Notes: For each comparison, the table reports point estimates for the MP and CMP statistics; a positive value
indicates dominance in the sample (emboldened to highlight them). Bootstrap 95 percent confidence intervals for
MP and CMP are reported in parentheses. Figures in square brackets give the proportion p of bootstrap replications
in which we do not observe dominance (asterisks mark instances with p < 0.01).
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individuals in households with imputation of at least one major household income com-
ponent reduces the sample by up to 75%–80%. As a result, we increased the bandwidth
used to derive the income growth profile to h = 0.2 for the ‘no self-employed’ subsample
and to h = 0.3 for subsamples excluding imputed data.
Excluding self-employed households leads to no substantial change in results. Profiles
are not markedly flatter (except for very high p). When observations with imputed
incomes are excluded, income growth profiles remain negatively-sloped but they become
much flatter. Broad conclusions about general trends remain valid, although the much
reduced sample sizes makes it difficult to draw robust conclusions with confidence and
statistical significance is weaker.
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Figure B4. Income growth profiles (no self-employed subsample)
Note. Top panel shows absolute growth (change in real income in pounds); bottom panel
shows proportionate growth (change in log real income).
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(a) Absolute income growth profiles
-75
-50
-25
0
25
50
In
co
m
e 
gr
ow
th
0 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90 1
Initial fractional rank, p
1992-1996 1995-1999
1998-2002 2001-2005
(b) Cumulative absolute income growth
profiles
0
10
20
30
40
50
In
co
m
e 
gr
ow
th
0 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90 1
Initial fractional rank, p
1992-1996 1995-1999
1998-2002 2001-2005
(c) Relative income growth profiles
1991-1996
1994-1999
1997-2002
2000-2005
-.1
0
.1
.2
.3
Lo
g 
in
co
m
e 
gr
ow
th
0 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90 1
Initial fractional rank, p
1992-1996 1995-1999
1998-2002 2001-2005
(d) Cumulative relative income growth
profiles
0
.1
.2
.3
Lo
g 
in
co
m
e 
gr
ow
th
0 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90 1
Initial fractional rank, p
1992-1996 1995-1999
1998-2002 2001-2005
Figure B7. Income growth profiles (no imputed income subsample)
Note. Top panel shows absolute growth (change in real income in pounds); bottom panel
shows proportionate growth (change in log real income).
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Appendix C Accounting for age: sample ageing and life-
cycle dynamics
Consideration of simple life-cycle earnings dynamics suggests a systematic association
between income, income growth and age. While the association in terms of equival-
ized disposable income is much more complex than what simple earnings dynamics may
suggest (Jenkins, 2009, 2011), it is a valid concern that income growth patterns, and
differences in them between periods, partly reflect (i) the ageing of the panel sample and
(ii) straightforward life-cycle patterns. We consider these two issues in this section.
Sample ageing
Incomes vary systematically with age (on average) and so, if the age composition of the
sample changes over time, part of the change in the distribution of income growth across
the four time periods considered may reflect this phenomenon. The BHPS design is
intended to preserve representativeness and minimize the possibility of the sample ageing
(through its following rules, and post-hoc using weights). However, we observe a gradual
ageing of our samples over time: mean age increases from 38.26 in the 1992-93-94 sample
to 42.72 in the 2006-07-08 sample. To reassure ourselves that sample ageing is not driving
our results, we have also computed our estimates using ‘standardized’ samples. These are
samples in which the age structure of the 1992–1996 subsample is imposed on all three
later subsamples.6
Standardisation is implemented by reweighting subsample observations so that the
age distributions for each subsample are the same as the distribution in the first of the
four periods. The reweighting factor for observation i with age ai in the subsample for
the later period beginning in year s is defined as
pii(s) =
Pr( a = ai | t = 1992 )
Pr( a = ai | t = s ) (23)
where Pr( a = ai | t = s ) is the relative frequency of observations with age ai in the
subsample for period (s, s+τ). Using Bayes’ rule, the reweighting factor can be expressed
20
equivalently as
pii(s) =
Pr( t = 1992 | a = ai )
Pr( t = s | a = ai )
Pr( t = s )
Pr( t = 1992 ) (24)
where Pr( t = s ) is the proportion of observations from period (s, s + τ) in a pooled
sample of 1992–1996 and period (s, s + τ) observations, and Pr( t = s | a = ai ) is the
proportion of period (s, s + τ) observations in this pooled sample given age equal ai.
The reweighting factors are then multiplied by the sample weights and applied in all
computations for periods other than 1992–1996. We estimated reweighting factors using
expression (24) with the conditional probabilities computed from a probit model in which
the covariates represent a linear spline in age with knots placed at ages 5, 12, 25, 35, 45,
60, and 70.
The estimates are displayed in Figures C1 and C2. Differences over time for age-
standardized estimates are virtually identical to the non-standardized estimates that we
presented earlier.
Adjusting for life-cycle income changes
In an elementary process of earnings dynamics over the life-cycle, incomes follow an in-
verted U-shape. This suggests that earnings grow faster when earnings are low over a
person’s lifetime profile and decrease when earnings are high. In this elementary model,
a downward sloping ‘progressive’ income growth profile therefore arises because of simple
life-cycle earnings dynamics. In practice, the pattern of lifetime income is not so elemen-
tary because incomes include many other sources than one’s own earnings and because
the individual earnings process is not characterized by smooth changes over time. Also,
the income growth profile averages over a population of heterogenous individuals mixing
heterogenous earnings processes of different levels and slopes. Nevertheless we investigate
in this sub-section the effect of netting out individual life-cycle effects.
We consider three ways of controlling for life-cycle effects. First and most simply,
we ran preliminary regressions of individual incomes on a polynomial in age and derive
an ‘age-corrected income’ as the sum of income predicted at age 40 and the regression
residual for each observation. This is done separately at each wave of the survey. Income
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growth profiles are then derived on the basis of age-adjusted income – that is, both initial
ranks and income growth are ‘age corrected’ as per individual incomes at age 40. The
second approach involves regression of individual income growth on a polynomial in age
and construction ‘age corrected income growth’ as the sum of income growth predicted at
age 40 and the regression residual. Income growth profiles then use unadjusted income to
rank individuals but conditional income growth uses age-adjusted income growth where
income growth is as per predicted at age 40. Finally, the third approach consists in
ranking individuals within respondents of the same age group when deriving income
growth profiles.7 This procedure uniformly distributes individuals of different age over
the initial income rank ordering, thereby avoiding any systematic age-related relationship
between initial income rank and income growth. In this scenario, social weight is now
assumed to be determined by the relative position of individuals within their age group.
While the first approach is standard in the literature on earnings dynamics (Gottschalk
and Moffitt, 2009, see, e.g.,), the third avoids additional regression assumptions but makes
a normative adjustment to the measurement approach.
Estimates of income growth profiles using the three age-adjustments are provided in
Figures C3, C4 and C5. None of the adjustments modify the shape of the income growth
profiles significantly. The pro-poor nature of the patterns still hold and the contrast of
the four time-periods is largely unaffected.
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(d) Cumulative proportionate income growth pro-
files
0
.1
.2
.3
Lo
g 
in
co
m
e 
gr
ow
th
0 0.10 0.30 0.50 0.70 0.90 1
Initial fractional rank, p
1992-1996 1995-1999
1998-2002 2001-2005
Figure C3. Income growth profiles adjusted for life-cycle effects using regression-based age-
corrected individual incomes (predicted to age 40)
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(b) Cumulative absolute income growth profiles
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(c) Proportionate income growth profiles
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(d) Cumulative proportionate income growth pro-
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Figure C4. Income growth profiles adjusted for life-cycle effects using regression-based age-
corrected income growth (predicted to age 40)
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(a) Absolute income growth profiles
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Figure C5. Income growth profiles adjusted for life-cycle effects using base-year rank computed
within age groups
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Notes
1The distribution of the sum of initial and final period incomes is a function of the
joint distribution H: FXY (y) =
∫ y
0
∫ t
0 dH(t− s, s)ds dt.
2This result is similar to that derived by Dardanoni (1993) for distributions sum-
marised in terms of transition matrices. Assessment based on comparisons of the distri-
bution of the sum of base- and final-period income against a replication of base-period
income is also the starting point of Chakravarty et al. (1985).
3An analogy may help. If one rolls a standard die, the expected number of spots at any
roll is 3.5 (the sum of the possible scores divided by six). If the first roll in fact produces
a 1, then the expected increase in the score when the die is rolled again is positive (+2.5).
By contrast, if a 6 comes up first, the expected gain at the second roll is negative (–2.5).
So, despite there being no association between the first and the second rolls (the die is
fair), there is a correlation between the initial outcome and the change in outcome.
4Gottschalk and Huynh (2010) fit a measurement error model to linked survey and
administrative record data on the earnings of US men. See also Dragoset and Fields
(2006) who use the same data, but a larger collection of mobility measures, and find that
qualitative findings are similar for administrative and survey data. Quantitative findings
often differ more substantially but no systematic pattern is found. Fields et al. (2003)
and Grimm (2007) use a calibrated version of a model similar to that of Gottschalk and
Huynh (2010) to place bounds on the impact of measurement error on estimates of the
correlation between incomes in two years.
5The curves are somewhat steeper than in our baseline estimates, but note that the
income change reported here is not based on 3-year smoothing. Comparable estimates
not based on 3-year smoothing and without proxying base yeear rank are substantially
steeper, as expected.
6This is similar to the technique of ‘direct standardisation’ that is commonly used in
demography.
7To estimate conditional (‘within group’) ranks, data are first binned into age-intervals
of 6 years and conditional ranks are estimated for observations within each bin using local
kernel smoothing over the two adjacent bins.
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